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The hallmark of an effective estate plan is the precise implemen-
tation of all planning objectives. One planning objective of crucial
importance is to determine the impact of charging various interested
parties with the ultimate burden of death taxes. Ideally, the burden
is borne by those persons designated by the estate owner through the
estate plan. Since the implementation of the plan can be considered
successful only when it unmistakably carries out the owner's wishes,
the provision directing the allocation of death taxes must be clearly
expressed.
No estate plan should be considered complete without a careful
consideration of the funds to be used to pay estate taxes. An estate
plan which does not produce a distribution among intended benefi-
ciaries and in intended amounts is a failure regardless of how fairly
the ultimate burden of estate taxes is distributed by the courts or by
post-mortem agreements between the interested parties. While the
importance of draftsmanship should not be underestimated, this article
is not devoted to the methods of careful explication and adequate pro-
vision,1 but rather to the manner in which the estate tax burden is
shared by persons interested in the taxable estate when a testator
fails to effectively fix the burden.
While all states grant individuals the option of directing how the
death tax burden is to be allocated among interested persons,2 states
differ in their approach to the method of allocation when the decedent
fails to control the burden effectively. The decisional law of the dece-
dent's domicile determines the ultimate burden for death taxes in the
absence of an apportionment statute or a controlling tax clause.
3
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law on leave from
the University of Toledo College of Law.
1. A tax allocation clause must be clear and unequivocal, especially %hen the burden
is shifted from where the law would otherwise have placed it. The need for clear expression
is illustrated by the position taken by Ohio courts that a general testamentary direction to pay
all debts and taxes from the estate is not sufficiently indicative of intention to have the probate
estate pay the estate taxes generated by nonprobate property. See In re Estate of Gatch, 153
Ohio St. 401, 92 N.E.2d 404 (1950).
2. Minan, A Scrivener's "Delight"-The Marital Deduction Formula Clause, 37 Ouo ST.
LJ. 81, 91 (1976).
3. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942). The burden of death taxes may be shifted by
tax clauses in documents that are other than testamentary in nature. An inter vivos trust,
for example, that is includible in a decedents gross estate for purposes of death taxation
may direct that the trustee contribute to the payment of taxes.
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The issue of who ultimately bears the estate tax burden should be dis-
tinguished at the outset from the general principle that federal4 and
state5 law require the personal representative of the decedent's estate
to pay the death taxes. The fact that the personal representative ini-
tially pays the tax does not determine who ultimately will bear the es-
tate tax burden. The personal representative's obligation is imposed
for the purpose of convenience of tax collection and not for the pur-
pose of fixing the final estate tax burden.6
States employ either full apportionment,7 partial apportionment,8
or the burden on the residue rule9 when the decedent fails to fix the
estate tax burden. Under full apportionment the death tax liability
is shared by all persons interested in the estate in the proportion that
the value of the property received bears to the total value of all prop-
erty in the gross estate. In making the apportionment, however, those
shares that generate no tax, such as gifts to a spouse or to a charity, are
4. I.R.C. § 2002 provides that the federal estate tax shall be piid by the executor. Trca,
Reg. 20.2002-1 extends this obligation to the administrator of a decedent's estate,
5. OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5731.21 (Page 1973).
6. As to life insurance and property over which the decede-it had a general power of
appointment, Congress has provided that the portion of the estate attributable to those assets
be borne by them; however, the decedent retains the power to direct otherwise. I.R.C. §§ 2206,
2207.
7. Apportionment as to all assets: ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.610 (1973); ARK, STAT. ANN
§ 63-150 (1971); CAL. PROB. CODE § 970 (West 1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-401 (West
1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2901 (Michie 1974); HAW. REV. STAT. § 236A-2 (1976);
IDAHO CODE § 15-3-916 (Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN, § 29-2-12-1 (Burns 1972); Gratz v. Hamil-
ton, 309 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. 1958) (dictum); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2432 (West 1965); MD. Esel
& TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-109 (1974); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 720.12 (1968). MINN, STAT.
ANN. § 524.3-916 (West 1975); NEa. REV. STAT. § 77-2108 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 150,310
(1975); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 88-A:2 (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN, §§ ZA:25-30 to -33 (West 1953);
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRusrs LAW § 2-1.8(a) (McKinney 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-20-16
(1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 116.313 (1975); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3702 (Purdon 1975); RI.
GEN. LAWS § 44-23.1-2 (Supp. 1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 29-7-1 (1976); TLNN. CODE
ANN. § 30-1117 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-916 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7302 (Supp,
1977); VA. CODE § 64.1-161 (1973); W. VA. CODE § 44-2-16a (1966); Wyo. STAT. § 2-338
(Supp. 1975).
8. Apportionment as to nonprobate assets: In re Estate of Garcia, 9 Arz. App. 587, 455
P.2d 269 (1969) (probate assets); Doetsch v. Doetsch, 312 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1963) (applying
Arizona law to nonprobate assets); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.817 (We',t 1976); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 65A, § 5 (Michie/Law Coop. Supp. 1977); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 364 Mo. 782, 267 S.W.2d
632 (1954); In re Estate of Marans, 143 Mont. 388, 390 P.2d 443 (1964); In re Gallagher's
Will, 57 N.M. 112, 255 P.2d 317 (1953); McDougall v. Central Nat'l Bank, 157 Ohio St. 45,
104 N.E.2d 441 (1952); S.C. CODE § 65-563 (Supp. 1975).
9. Burden on the residue: ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 449(1) (1958); Ramsey v. Nordloh, 143
Colo. 526, 354 P.2d 513 (1960); In re Estate of Collins, 269 F. Supp 633 (D.D.C. 1967); GA.
CODE ANN. § 92-3401 (1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 18-14 (Smith-Htrd 1975); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 633.449 (West Supp. 1977); Spurrier v. First Nat'l Bank, 207 Kan. 406, 485 P.2d 209
(1971); Old Colony Trust Co. v. McGowan, 156 Me. 138, 163 A.2d 538 (1960); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 27-9-33 (1972); Park v. Carroll, 18 N.C. App. 53, 196 S.E.2d 40 (1973); Tapp v. Mitchell,
352 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1960) (nonprobate assets), In re Rettemeyer's Estate, 345 P.2d 872 (Okla,
1959); Sinnott v. Gidney, 159 Tex. 366, 322 S.W.2d 507 (1959) (at least as to probate assets);
In re Estate of Eberle, 4 Wash. App. 638, 484 P.2d 478 (1971); In re Uihlein's Will, 264 Wis.
362, 59 N.W.2d 641 (1953); Estate of Joas v. Langrill, 16 Wis.2d 439, 114 NW.2d 831 (1962)
(nonprobate assets).
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excused from contribution.' ° A majority of jurisdictions have adopted
full apportionment."
The burden on the residue rule, in contrast, places the tax liability
on those persons who bear the burden of the debts and other expenses
of the decedent's estate. Under this method of allocation the death
taxes are paid from the estate in the same manner as any other debt
of the estate. In practice, this most frequently means that the residue
of the estate is charged with the death tax liability when the decedent
dies testate.' 2 When the burden of the estate tax falls on the residue
and more than one residuary beneficiary is named, each beneficiary
automatically bears a proportionate part of the tax since the residuary
shares are determined after the estate tax is calculated. 3  In the
event that property passes by partial intestacy, or in the instance where
the residuary is insufficient or nonexistent, the allocation of the death
tax burden frequently follows the common law abatement pattern.'
4
Partial apportionment combines both methods of allocation. Un-
der partial apportionment nonprobate assets bear a pro rata share of
the estate tax, while the burden on the residue principle is retained for
assets comprising the probate estate.
Certain states control the question of the ultimate burden of
death tax liability by statute. 5 Ohio, however, has not adopted a
statutory method of apportionment. The purpose of this article is to
examine Ohio's method of allocating estate taxes in the most fre-
quently encountered situations: when a testator fails to fix the estate
tax burden effectively and when a surviving spouse elects against the
testator's will. The thesis of this article is that Ohio's method of allo-
cating estate taxes16 as presently operated can frustrate a testator's
predictable expectations. The first part of this article analyzes the de-
velopment of the decisional rules on allocation when a decedent fails
to fix the estate tax burden. The leading cases are analyzed in order
to identify the deficiencies of the present structure. Since a dece-
10. Kahn, The Federal Estate Tax Burden Borne by a Dissenting I|dow, 64 Mtc1. L
Rev. 1499, 1506 (1966).
11. See note 7 supra.
12. For example, in the intestate situation in Ohio when the probate estate generates the
estate tax liability, and ratable sharing results through the interrelationship of O1to RE%'.
CODE ANN. §§ 2117.25 and 2105.06
13. In jurisdictions first calling on personal property in the residue to settle debts and costs
of administration, including tax claims, before requiring contribution from real estate, the
burden on the residue rule may not result in ratable sharing. See, Boehm, Death and Taxes-],
22 OHIo ST. LJ. 327, 345 (1961).
14. See T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WiLLs § 136 (2d ed. 1953).
15. For an illustration of the statutory approach to apportionment, see UNIFORM PROBi 4E
CODE § 3-916, excerpted in note 79 infra.
16. The Ohio estate tax is a debt against the estate in the same manner as the federal
estate tax. Spears v. Madden, 28 Ohio Misc. 125, 276 N.E.2d 669 (P. Ct. 1971).
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dent's taxable estate most frequently consists of either probate and non-
probate assets or just probate assets, the cases are analyzed within
this organizational framework. The second part of the article exam-
ines the method of allocating estate taxes when a surviving spouse
elects against a will. It is devoted to an examination of the rational-
ity of Ohio's system of allocating estate taxes in the election context.
The final part of the article is devoted to an identification of the major
policies that should be reflected in the statutory method of allocation
and its interrelation with the election statute. The Uniform Probate
Code is proposed to the legislature as a vehicle for the reform. The en-
actment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, provides an opportunity for
estate planners to re-examine and adjust all wills and estate plans to
meet the changes in the new law. Similarly, the Ohio legislature
should consider it an auspicious time to consider whether the continued
allocation of estate taxes by judicial rule is desirable.
I. THE BURDEN ON THE RESIDUE RULE AND THE EMERGENCE
OF EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
Shortly after Congress enacted the federal estate tax," the Ohio
Supreme Court decided a case that was influential in the development
of the general proposition that federal estate taxes should not be ap-
portioned when a testator fails to fix the estate tax burden. In YMCA
v. Davis,18 the court held that the residuary legatee bears the burden of
the estate tax and the beneficiaries of the specific bequests are
exonerated. The residuary legatees, who were tax exempt charities,
were granted certiorari 9 by the United States Supreme Court for the
purpose of examining the federal question whether the charities were
deprived of the federal right to tax exemption secured by the Internal
Revenue Code. 20 The United States Supreme Court held that the Code
only required an estate tax deduction in the amount of the charitable
gift and that federal law did not exempt the recipient of charitable gifts
from taxation.21
The decedent in Davis had failed to designate in her will specifi-
17. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 200-212, 39 Stat. 777-780. 1002 (1916) (now I.R.C,
§ 2001). For a discussion of the history of federal estate taxes see Eisenstein. 7Te Rise and
Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAx. L. REV. 223 (1956).
18. 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N. E. 114 (1922), af'd, 264 U.S. 47 (1924).
19. 262 U.S. 739 (1923).
20. 264 U.S. 47, 49 (1924).
21. After the Davis decision many jurisdictions mistakenly .oncluded that Congre s
intended to specify who was to bear the burden of the estate tax liability. This mirage of
supposed congressional intent was demolished, however, a few years later when the Supreme
Court held:
We are of opinion that Congress intended that the federal estate tax should be
paid out of the estate as a whole, and that the applicable state law as to the devolution
of property at death should govern the distribution of the remairder and the ultimate
[Vol. 38:539
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cally who was to bear the estate tax burden. The executor filed a
petition in the court of common pleas for construction of the will and
for advice and direction concerning the federal estate tax and the dis-
tribution of the assets.22  The fundamental issue before the Ohio Su-
preme Court was whether the residuary beneficiaries should bear
the ultimate weight of the estate tax burden or whether it should be
apportioned between the residuary and specific legatees. As a theo-
retical proposition the court was faced with a third possible alterna-
tive in resolving the dispute between the specific beneficiaries and
residuary legatees. The residuary legatees could have been exoner-
ated from bearing any estate tax burden with the burden thereby
shifted to the specific beneficiaries.
Two reasons can be distilled from the Ohio court's decision to
place the estate tax liability on the residuary legatees even though the
assets passing to the charities generated no tax liability: the first was
based on the nature of the estate tax, and the second on the intention
of the testatrix. The nature of the estate tax, the court reasoned,
was such that it had no relation whatsoever to any particular devise
or legacy, or the right of any person to take or receive a portion of
the estate.23 It concluded that since the estate tax is a charge against
the entire estate, and not against any particular bequest or legacy, as
would be the situation if an inheritance tax were involved, the liability
for the tax should be treated like the other charges, debts, and costs
of administration. 24  The well-established principle that other charges,
debts, and costs of administration are payable from the residue pro-
vided the court with the analytical foundation to conclude that estate
taxes were to be similarly treated. The issue of which assets gen-
erated the estate tax liability did not, in the court's estimation, con-
trol the question of who was to bear the burden for the tax liability.
In contrast to an inheritance tax system, which is designed to
tax the right to receive certain property, an estate tax clearly is not
a charge against particular assets. The recognition of this fundamen-
tal difference between the nature of an estate tax and an inheritance
impact of the federal tax; accordingly, § 124 is not in conflict with the federal estate
tax law ....
. . . It did not undertake in any manner to specify who was to bear the burden of
the tax. Its legislative history indicates clearly that Congress did not contemplate that
the Government would be interested in the distribution of the estate after the tax was
paid, and that Congress intended that state law should determine the ultimate thrust
of the tax. . . .
In reaching a contrary result, the court below relied primarily upon § 826(b). But
that section does not direct how the estate is to be distributed, nor does it determine
who shall bear the ultimate burden of the tax.
Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 97-100 (1942) (footnotes omitted).
22. 106 Ohio St. at 367, 40 N.E. at 114.
23. Id. at 369, 40 N.E. at 115.
24. Id. See Lauritzen, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes. I TAx CoursELoWs Q.
55 (1957).
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tax does not mean, however, that the ultimate burden for the estate
tax cannot or should not be placed on individual recipients of the estate.
The estate tax burden is levied against the whole of the decedent's tax-
able estate and should not be viewed as an obligation of only the assets
in the residuary but of all the assets in the taxable estate. This posi-
tion is supported by the Internal Revenue Code provision that if the tax
is not paid, the individuals in possession of the transferred property
are personally liable for the tax to the extent of the value of the prop-
erty.25 The nature of the estate tax and its analogy to other charges,
debts, and costs of administration is of doubtful analytical utility in the
determination of who should ultimately be required to bear the burden
of the tax.
The other basis of the Davis decision lies in that sovereign guide,
intent. The court reasoned that
it is to be presumed that a legacy specific as to the person, thing or
amount, shall have priority over a mere general provision; especially,
from its very nature, over all residuary devises and legacies.
This fact affords a clear and conclusive presumption that all charges
imposed by the law or by the testator should be paid out of the estate
before any rights should ripen in behalf of the residuary devisees or
legatees under this item [of the will].
This view supports the undoubted intention of the testator in the
making of the will in all its various provisions.2 6
The petition at the trial level was for the construction of the
testatrix's will concerning the allocation of estate taxes, and the testa-
trix's intention was supposedly of paramount importance in imposing
the burden on the residuary legatees. The court, however, failed to
see any significance in the circumstance that the testatrix's will was
executed in 1914, some two years before the estate tax act was en-
acted. Obviously, the testatrix had neither intent with regard to the
specific allocation of estate taxes nor realization of its impact. More-
25. I.R.C. § 6324(a)(2) provides:
If the estate tax imposed by chapter 11 is not paid when due, then the spouse, trans-
feree, trustee (except the trustee of an employees' trust which meets the require-
ments of section 401(a)), surviving tenant, person in possession of the property by
reason of the exercise, nonexercise, or release of a power of appointment or beneficiary,
who receives, or has on the date of the decedent's death, property included in the
gross estate under sections 2034 to 2042, inclusive, to the extent of the value, at the
time of the decedent's death, of such property, shall be personally liable for such tax.
Any part of such property transferred by (or transferred by a transferee of) such
spouse, transferee, trustee, surviving tenant, person in possession, or beneficiary, to a
purchaser or holder of a security interest shall be divested of the lien provided in
paragraph (1) and a like lien shall then attach to all the property of such spouse,
transferee, trustee, surviving tenant, person in possession, or beneficiary, or transferee
of any such person, except any part transferred to a purchaser or a holder of a security
interest.
26. 106 Ohio St. at 369-70, 140 N.E. at 115 (emphasis added).
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over, the conclusive presumption established by the Ohio Supreme
Court subsumed the relevance of intent since no evidence was admis-
sible to rebut it. The intention to charge the residuary with the burden
for estate taxes was imputed and conclusive.
The Davis court observed that the use of a conclusive presump-
tion supports the undoubted intention of the testator. The danger of
implying intent with regard to allocating taxes from the nature of a
residuary disposition is illustrated by Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust
Co.,27 which was cited approvingly by Davis. In Plunkett, the testator
apparently wished to divide his estate between his two sons in ap-
proximately equal shares.28 Unfortunately, there was no direction
concerning who was to bear the estate tax burden. The Massachu-
setts court concluded that the residue, which had been bequeathed
to only one son, should through the application of the burden on the
residue rule bear the entire estate tax burden.29  Assuming that the
testator intended to divide his estate equally between his sons, the
inference derived from characterizing the gifts as specific and residu-
ary frustrated, rather than furthered, the testator's intent. Thus, the
mechanical application of the burden on the residue rule with regard
to the allocation of estate taxes can produce undesirable results.
The primary purpose in construing a will is to determine, if pos-
sible, a testator's actual intent rather than an intent presumed by
law.30  Under the Davis rationale a testator's silence on the alloca-
tion of the tax burden combined with the use of a residuary dispo-
sition renders the search for actual intent unnecessary. The problem
with erecting a conclusive presumption, thereby rendering actual in-
tent immaterial, is evident when the results obtained by applying
the presumption are inconsistent with the testator's probable intent
as in Plunkett. When the results suggest that actual intent is likely
to be inconsistent with the intention presumed by the law, continued
adherence to Davis is both unwise and unnecessary. Rules of con-
struction should be flexibly applied to further the intention of the testa-
tor, and this cannot be accomplished if the search for actual intent is
foreclosed by the application of a conclusive presumption.
Although the Davis court rejected the doctrine of equitable ap-
portionment in favor of the burden on the residue rule, Ohio experi-
enced the emergence of a limited application of the doctrine of
27. 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919).
28. The provision for one son under the will and codicils was a gift outright of property
valued at approximately S14,000 and a gift of property valued at little more than S382.000 to
a trustee under a spendthrift provision, to pay income for life and a giftover of the remainder.
The residue of the estate, valued at a little over S381.000. was bequeathed to the other son.
Id. at 472, 124 N.E. at 265.
29. Id. at 474, 124 N.E. at 267.
30. 4 W. BowE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON TIIE LAw OF WILLS § 30.1 (3d ed. 1961).
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equitable apportionment in McDougall v. Central National Bank Co."
In McDougall the decedent died intestate leaving a taxable estate
composed of both probate and nonprobate assets. The taxable non-
probate assets were held in an inter vivos trust. Since decedent died
without a will, the issue of apportionment among testate beneficiaries
was not involved as it was in Davis. The inclusion of the nonprobate
assets in the taxable estate increased the estate tax. The personal
representative paid the estate tax from the probate estate and then
brought suit to recover an equitable portion of the tax generated by
the nonprobate assets. Thus, the court was faced with the issue of
whether the entire burden of the estate tax should fall on the probate
estate or whether the nonprobate property should bear a proportional
share of the tax. The court decided that the doctrine of equitable
apportionment was applicable, and the estate ta2: burden was pro-
portionally distributed among all interested parties.
In holding that the nonprobate assets should bear a proportional
share of the federal estate tax liability, the court reasoned that "in
the absence of any apparent intention of the decedent to the contrary,
one who pays more than his share of that common obligation should
be entitled to contribution from those who have not paid their
share. 32 In other words, the right to contribution arises by reason of
the compulsory discharge of more than the probate's share of a com-
mon obligation. The court also reasoned that when an individual dies
intestate there is no reason for placing a greater burden on one part of
the taxable estate than another since no expression of intent exists.
This approach to the distribution of the estate tax burden is an applica-
tion of the equitable concept of contribution.
If the principle of the Davis case had been found controlling in
McDougall, the beneficiaries of the probate estate would have been
required to bear the increase in the federal estate taxes due to the
inclusion of the nonprobate assets in the taxable estate. Instead, the
court fostered the partial emergence of the doctrine of equitable
apportionment and distinguished Davis on the folloving basis:
The instant case is not like Young Men's Christian Assn. v. Davis,
supra, where, by the terms of her will, the testator indicated a preference
for certain legatees by providing for them specifically and then spe-
cifically stating that what was left was to go to other legatees. In such an
instance, especially where only probate assets are involved, it is ap-
parent that those who are designated by the testator to take what is left
over were intended by the testator to bear the burden of the debts,
estate tax and other obligations of the estate, while the testator did not
intend that those who were specifically provided for were to bear that
burden.
33
31. 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952).
32. Id. at 54-55, 104 N.E.2d at 446.
33. Id. at 58, 104 N.E.2d at 447.
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The court rejected the argument that the trust agreement provided
the necessary guidance on intent to charge the probate estate with
the increased tax burden. Conceptually the argument was analogous
to the contention advanced by specific legatees in Davis, that the
structure of the will indicated an intent that the estate tax be paid out
of the residue. The court rejected that argument in McDougall on the
theory that a clear expression of intent was missing and that to con-
clude otherwise would be speculation. Once the court concluded
that intent was absent, it was a short analytical step to the conclusion
that the nonprobate trust assets contributed to the common obliga-
tion imposed on the estate, and that the doctrine of equitable con-
tribution was proper.
The doctrine of equitable apportionment is based on the concept
that the burden should be borne by all the persons upon whom it is
imposed. Since the estate tax is a lien against the whole estate, the
artificial concept of the two parts of a taxable estate does not destroy
the concept that the federal estate tax structure contemplates but one
taxable estate. The persuasiveness of this type of reasoning is evident
when one examines the nature of lien for estate taxes.34 Since the lien
attaches to all property and rights to property belonging to such
persons who are liable to pay the estate tax, the nonprobate bene-
ficiaries should share in the cost of discharge.3
The formula to be used in determining the share of the federal
estate tax that should be allocated to the nonprobate assets was
articulated by the McDougall court as follows:
[I]n determining the share of the common obligation represented by the
estate tax which should be allocated to the trust estate, there appears to
be no fairer or more reasonable approach than to compare the value for
estate tax purposes of nonprobate assets which had an effect in generat-
ing estate tax liability with the value for estate tax purposes of probate
assets which had that effect, and to allocate on that basis to nonprobate
and to probate assets their proportionate share of the whole estate tax
liability. 36
34. I.R.C. § 6324(a)(2).
35. Treas. Reg. § 301.6324-1(a)(1) (1972) provides:
A lien for estate tax attaches at the date of the decedents death to every part of the
gross estate, whether or not the property comes into possession of the duly qualified
executor or administrator. The lien attaches to the extent of the tax shown to be due
by the return and of any deficiency in tax found to be due upon review and audit.
If the estate tax is not paid when due, then the spouse, transferee, trustee (except the
trustee of an employee's trust which meets the requirements of section 401(a)). sur-
viving tenant, person in possession of the property, by reason of the exercise. non-
exercise, or release of a power of appointment, or beneficiary, who receives, or has on
the date of the decedents death, property included in the gross estate under sections
2034 to 2042, inclusive, shall be personally liable for the tax to the extent of the value.
at the time of the decedent's death, of the property.
36. 157 Ohio St. at 58-59, 104 N.E.2d at 447-48.
19771
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Under McDougall, the judicial rules applying or rejecting the
apportionment concept are operative only when the decedent fails to
express an intent or when the intent cannot be implied, Since the
decedent died intestate a vehicle for implying intent was not pro-
vided. In other cases, such as Davis, where the court is willing to
conclusively presume intent from the characterization of gifts, equi-
table apportionment is inapplicable. The adoption of partial appor-
tionment in McDougall was a reaction to the inju;3tice inherent in the
application of the rationale underlying the burden on the residue rule
when the decedent's intent was neither expressed nor could be im-
plied. To follow the principles underlying the burden on the residue
rule in McDougall would have been to enrich the nonprobate benefi-
ciaries at the expense of the probate estate. Thus, the decision furthers
the policy of alleviating the effect of an unexpected tax burden upon
the probate estate.
Although the testate counterpart of McDougall was some years in
coming, it finally arrived in the case of In re Estate of Penney." 
Decedent died testate leaving a taxable estate of approximately 14.5
million dollars; for tax purposes the probate assets were valued at
about 4.7 million dollars and the nonprobate assets at a little more
than 9.8 million dollars. The testator's will included charitable be-
quests, a marital deduction bequest designed to increase the marital
deduction to the maximum amount, and a pour-over of the residuary
to an inter vivos trust. Incredibly, no testamentary instructions on
allocation of the estate tax burden were included. The inter vivos
trust authorized the trustee, with the approval of the trust's advisory
committee, to pay the executor a sufficient sum to discharge debts and
all taxes of the estate in the event the assets available to the executor
were insufficient.38
In the Tax Court the Internal Revenue Service argued that the
testator intended for all the probate estate assets to be expended for
the payment of estate taxes before funds were to be contributed by
the trustee.39 As a practical matter the success of this argument would
result in the tax totally consuming the probate estate and cause the
failure of the marital and charitable bequests. The estate, on the
other hand, argued two distinguishable facets of the doctrine of
equitable apportionment: first, that transfers generating no estate
tax were exonerated from liability, and second, that the nonprobate
trust assets includible in the gross estate for tax purposes must
contribute to the federal estate tax, but those trust assets not generat-
ing tax should be exonerated.40  The Tax Court held that the testa-
37. 504 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1974).
38. Id. at 39.
39. Estate of Penney v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 102, 105-06 (1972).
40. Id. at 105.
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mentary transfers qualifying for the marital and charitable deductions
were required to contribute to the estate tax and that the inter vivos
trust was also responsible for bearing a portion of the federal estate
tax liability. This decision resulted in apportioning the tax between
the probate and nonprobate estate, but in the process charged non-
probate assets that did not generate estate tax with a pro rata share
of the tax.4'
The estate appealed to the Sixth Circuit which held that to the
extent that transfers of nonprobate assets were includible in the tax-
able estate but did not generate tax, McDougall dictated that such
assets were not required to contribute. The court's reasoning was
that the McDougall formula for determining the relative contribution
to the common tax obligation included the asceitainment of the value
of the nonprobate assets that "had an effect in generating estate
tax liability."42 Thus, since the allocation formula was dependent on
a determination of nonprobate assets generating estate tax liability,
those assets not generating additional tax liability should be ex-
cluded from consideration in applying the doctrine of equitable ap-
portionment. Additionally, the court made the practical observation
that nonexoneration would be "'incredible' and contrary to what one
would presume a testator's normal intent to be; that is, to maximize
his deductions and minimize his tax liability.A3
Under the Penney decision, nonprobate property qualifying for
the marital or charitable deduction will not be obligated to contribute
to the payment of the federal estate tax. But if the property qualify-
ing for the deduction passes from the probate estate, the recipient
will be required to contribute unless the surviving spouse or charity
is a nonresiduary beneficiary and the residuary is sufficient to dis-
charge the estate tax obligation, or a specific clause in the will exoner-
ates the spouse or charity.
The triad of cases produces a peculiar framework of analysis.
In Davis the decedent died testate with only probate assets. The fact
that the decedent died testate was used as the principal basis of dis-
tinguishing it in McDougall, a case in which the decedent died intes-
tate but with both probate and nonprobate assets. In Penney the
decedent died testate, which would lead one to speculate that if the
McDougall distinction was analytically sound Penney should be
governed by the principles articulated in Davis. The formula es-
tablished in McDougall, however, was used to resolve the question
of contribution from the nonprobate assets even though the decedent
died intestate. In addition, it should be realized that McDougall did
not present the issue of whether nonprobate assets qualifying for the
41. Id. at 106-07.
42. 504 F.2d at 42.
43. Id. at 44.
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marital or charitable deductions should be required to contribute to
the payment of estate taxes. Yet, the McDougall formula of "gen-
erating estate tax liability," which was patently dictum, was used to
resolve this question in Penney.
With the exception of the special situation of election against
the will, the basic framework for the allocation of estate taxes was
completed with the Penney decision.44  Collectively Davis, McDou-
gall, and Penney provide the judicial guidance for the allocation of
estate taxes in Ohio when a decedent fails to fix the burden. To the
extent nonprobate assets generate estate tax liability, they share in the
discharge of the liability on the theory of equitable contribution. But
when tax liability is generated by the probate estate alone, the doctrine
of equitable contribution is rejected in favor of the burden on the
residue rule.45 Taxes are allocated to the residue as a result of a
conclusive presumption.
The principle deficiency in Ohio's method of allocation lies in the
thaumaturgic quality of the burden on the residue rule. Under Davis,
once the judicial eye detects a residuary disposition the inquiry with
regard to establishing actual intent is foreclosed by a conclusive
presumption. Like any general expression of legal doctrine, it must
be realized that the doctrine is not to be accepted and applied without
limitation or reserve.
In general, if a testator is aware of the potential estate tax burden
on the testamentary estate, a presumption that the burden is to be
borne by the residue of the estate is reasonable and practical since it
is consistent with the notion of knowledgeable awareness. Under
these circumstances the inherent nature of a residuary bequest will
reflect the actual intention of the testator. But if the presumption of
knowledgeable awareness is the basis of charging the residue with
estate taxes, the same presumption should be similarly applied when
considering who should bear the estate tax burden by nonprobate
assets. Not applying the presumption when nonprobate assets are
included in the taxable estate is based on the speculative premise
44. Although the reasoning in Penney has not been approved by the Ohio Supreme Court,
it is highly probable that such approval will be forthcoming.
45. Under Ohio law, implying a preference from the distinction between specific and
residuary dispositions is consistent with at least two other common situations, exoneration
and abatement. Ohio statutorily follows the common-law rule of exoneration. Ouo RIv.
CODE ANN. § 2107.54 (Page 1976) provides in part:
A devisee or legatee shall not be prejudiced by the fact that the holder of a claim
secured by lien on the property devised or bequeathed failed to present such claim
to the executor or administrator for allowance within the time allowed by sections
2117.06 and 2117.07 of the Revised Code, and the devisee or legatee shall be restored
by right of contribution, exoneration, or subrogation, to the poition he would have
occupied if such claim had been presented and allowed for such s~im as is justly owing
thereon.
Ohio's approach to abatement is also consistent. See 6 R. HAUSER, & A. DIENFINBACII, 011O
PRACTICE § 1018 (1969).
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that the testator is aware of the estate tax consequences attendant
with the inclusion of the probate assets in the taxable estate but un-
aware of the consequences associated with the nonprobate assets.
The predictable expectations of a testator should provide a limit
on the judicial method of allocation. Mechanical adherence to the
distinction between specific and residuary dispositions for the pur-
pose of fixing the estate tax burden may produce some results which
are both unfair and inconsistent with the testator's likely wishes.
Judicial rules of construction are designed to accomplish results
that are most likely to approximate the testator's desires and should
be applied only to the extent that they advance that important ob-
jective. Common-sense arguments, founded upon the policy of ob-
taining the result most likely to be desired by a majority of persons
making wills,46 exist for disregarding the burden on the residue rule
in cases when a beneficiary's share of the residue qualifies for a tax
deduction. This will occur when the residuary beneficiary is a surviv-
ing spouse and the share qualifies for the marital deduction,47 when
a residuary beneficiary is a charity and the share qualifies for the char-
itable deduction,48 or when a residuary beneficiary is an orphan and
the share qualifies for the orphan's deduction 9
An estate is entitled to a deduction when the passage of property
to the surviving spouse meets the technical requirements of the marital
deduction. If the spouse's bequest is contained in the residue, the
deductible amount is reduced by taxes payable from the spouse's
share of the residue under the burden on the residue rule, and an
interrelated compounding of the estate tax liability exists.5t This re-
46. Professor Powell incorporates this concept in the "normally operative rule." See
Powell Ultimate liability for Federal Estate Taxes, 1958 WASm U.L.Q. 327, 328 (1958).
47. I.R.C. § 2056. Property may be passed to the surviving spouse by any of four basic
methods to qualify for the marital deduction: 1) outright devise or bequest; 2) a legal life estate
coupled with the requisite power of appointment; 3) the creation of a trust whereby the sur-
viving spouse has a life estate coupled with the requisite power of appointment; and 4) the
creation of a trust whereby the surviving spouse has a life estate with the remainder payable
to the surviving spouse's estate, the "estate trust." See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(a)-2(b), 20.2056(b)-
1-20.2056(b)-5 (1958).
48. I.R.C. § 2055. The discussion of the technical requirements needed to obtain a chari-
table deduction is beyond the scope of this article. In addition to outright gifts, the methods
most frequently used to obtain the charitable deduction are the annuity trust (I.R.C. § 664
(d)(1)), the unitrust (I.R.C. § 664(d)(2)), or the pooled income fund (I.R.C. § 642(cX5)).
49. I.R.C. § 2057. A deduction is available if the decedent does not have a surviving
spouse and is survived by a minor child who is left with no known parent.
50. The most important substantive distinction between federal estate tax law and Ohio
estate tax law is that there is no marital deduction for Ohio estate tax purposes. Ohio does,
however, allow "an exemption equal to the value of any interest in property included in the
value of the decedent's gross estate that is, or has been transferred to or for the benefit of
and is vested in the surviving spouse." Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 5731.15(A)(2) (Page Supp.
1977).
51. The compounding problem and its deleterious effect is aggravated by the Tax Reform
Act of 1976. Under the Tax Reform Act the marital deduction with respect to estates having an
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sults in a greater estate tax and less property passing to the surviving
spouse and is predictably inconsistent with most testators' intentions.
This application of the burden on the residue rule can drastically
affect the testator's distribution plan. The residuary may be totally
consumed in the payment of death taxes.
The typical estate plan customarily gives the residue of the estate
to the paramount object of the testator's bounty.5 2 When a testator
gives a spouse a share of the residue, charging that share with estate
taxes can also place the spouse at a severe economic disadvantage
relative to the other beneficiaries of the estate. Rather than further-
ing the intent of the testator, the burden on the residue rule frustrates
it when the surviving spouse's share of the residue qualifies for the
marital deduction.
The idea that the testator has manifested a clear intention about
the allocation of estate taxes by designating some beneficiaries as
specific beneficiaries and others as residuary beneficiaries is not con-
sistent with common sense, especially when the spouse is the residuary
legatee. It is preposterous to think that a testator's intent is to have
his spouse's share of the estate bear the brunt of the estate tax burden.
The traditional rule of construction that compels such a result was
developed at a time when the estate tax was quite different than it is
today. Davis, which was the earliest principal case articulating the
burden on the residue rule in the context of estate taxes, was decided
prior to the adoption of the marital deduction53 and during the period
when estate taxes were relatively insignificant. Conditions have
changed since then, and the Tax Reform Act of 1976 has made con-
tinued adherence to the burden on the residue rule particularly trou-
blesome.54 Since the Act increases the potential marital deduction and
thus makes the potential loss greater, continued adherence to the pres-
ent judicial method of allocating estate taxes results in a greater penalty
when the surviving spouse is the beneficiary of the residue. Because
of this, the principles stated in Davis should not govern the decisional
path of cases that involve charging the surviving spouse's share of the
residue with a pro rata share of the federal estate tax liability.
When the surviving spouse's residuary share of the probate estate
does not generate additional estate tax liability the courts should be
adjusted gross estate of less than $500,000 has been liberalized. The estate may deduct up
to $250,000 irrespective of the 50% limitation. Since the deduction is limited to the value
that is passing or has passed from the decedent to the surviving ,pousc, failure to take ad-
vantage of the full marital deduction, which results from the compounding problem, more
severely penalizes the estate and surviving spouse than under the former law. See Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(a), 90 Stat. 1854 (amending I.R.C. § 2056(c)).
52. Eg., 2 J. MURPHY, MURPHY'S WILL CLAUSES 198.1 (1977).
53. For a discussion of the background and purpose of the marital deduction, see C.
LOWNDES, R. KRAMER, & J. MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Giri TAXES, § 17.1 (3d ed.
1974).
54. See note 51 supra.
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extremely reluctant to charge those assets with a pro rata share of
the estate tax liability on the basis of traditional characterizations
and inferences of intent. Rather than charging the spouse's share of
the residue, the policy should be reversed so that there is exoneration.
Such a change in policy is justifiable because it is logically consistent
with the expectations of most, if not all, testators."5 Furthermore,
exoneration furthers the desirable policy of uniformity since non-
probate assets qualifying for the marital deduction are exonerated.
To a certain extent conformity with federal law is also obtained since
the Internal Revenue Code provides that if the beneficiary of life
insurance or the recipient of property subject to a taxable power of
appointment is a surviving spouse, there is no obligation to con-
tribute to the estate tax to the extent that the property passed free of
tax under the marital deduction.56 The reorientation of policy toward
exoneration of the surviving spouse's share of the probate assets that
qualify for the marital deduction can be accomplished either by the
legislature or by the judiciary. Since the magnitude of the change is
substantial and is likely to depend on factual inquiries, the matter is
more properly for legislative determination.
The United States Supreme Court in Davis rejected the charity's
contention that federal law exempted them from paying the federal
estate tax.57 The court did not, however, preclude the possibility of
state law exempting the charities from contribution. Since a de-
ductible charitable gift does not increase the size of the taxable
estate, the charitable gift, like the qualifying marital share, should be
undiminished by the tax burden through the process of contribution.
The charitable deduction granted to an estate in the calculation
of federal estate taxes is based upon the amount actually received
by the charity.58 Therefore, the same compounding problem discussed
in connection with the marital deduction is present here. 9 When
death taxes are paid from the charity's share of the residue, the charity
obviously receives less than would be the case if the tax were either
55. After insuring the intended distribution of the estate a testator is most concerned
with minimization of estate taxes. Comment, Apportionment of Death Taxes: A Comprehen-
sive Survey with Proposed Statute, 45 TExAs L REv. 1348 (1967).
56. I.R.C. §§ 2206, 2207.
57. 264 U.S. at 50-51.
58. I.R.C. § 2055(a)(2).
59. I.R.C. § 2055(c). For purposes of the Ohio estate tax, Ohio REv. CODE A,. §
5731.17(A)(4) (Page 1973) provides in pertinent part:
If any estate, succession, or inheritance taxes are, either by the terms of the will, by
the law of the jurisdiction under which the estate is administered, or by the law or the
jurisdiction imposing the particular tax, payable in whole or in part out of the be-
quests, legacies, or devises otherwise deductible under this section, then the amount
deductible under this section shall be the amount of such bequests, legacies, or devises
unreduced by the amount of such taxes.
The complications present in the federal estate tax computation are avoided since the Ohio
charitable deduction is not reduced by any death taxes chargeable to the charity's share.
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apportioned or not charged at all. Since the amount of the charitable
deduction depends upon, and is reduced by the amount of taxes paid
from its share, it is evident that charging the charity through the
application of the burden on the residue has two impacts. First, the
estate will pay greater estate taxes since the charitable deduction is
less. Second, the amount ultimately received by the charity will be
less. Payment of the federal estate tax from the general estate, like
other administration expenses, operates to reduce the residuary gift
to charity. These results would rarely seem to be consistent with most
testator's intentions.
Exonerating charitable gifts from contribution involves substantial
policy considerations that are best dealt with through legislative
action. Nonetheless, when the results produced by the application
of the burden on the residue rule in the context of charitable gifts
are inconsistent with the probable intentions of the testator, courts
should not view themselves as being fettered in the application of
equitable principles. In these instances, a court reasonably could
find that such improbable results justify the conclusion that the tes-
tator had no actual intent with regard to fixing the estate tax burden.
If the results evidence that the testator did not think about the matter,
no amount of judicial construction will further intent where none
exists. When the decedent has expressed no intent about the ultimate
impact of the estate tax, the tax should be apportioned.
An orphan's estate tax deduction has been added to the existing
estate tax deductions for marital and charitable transfers by the Tax
Reform Act of 1976.60 The orphan's deduction provides an estate
tax deduction for gifts to minor children of the decedent where the
following requirements are met: 1) the decedent does not have a sur-
viving spouse; and 2) the decedent is survived by a minor child who,
immediately after the death of the decedent, has no known parent.6'
Since the property interest must pass to the minor child, the same kind
of potential interrelated compounding of estate taxes exists as has been
discussed in connection with the marital and charitable deductions.6 2
The orphan's deduction, however, is limited to the product of $5000
times the number of years the recipient orphan is under age 21 at the
date of the decedent's death.6' Thus, the potential loss through the
interrelated compounding of taxes when the orphan's share is required
to contribute to the payment of taxes is not as great as it is in the
marital and charitable cases. Few would agree, however, that this
makes the problem less serious.
60. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2057, Pub. L. No. 90-455, 90 Stat. 1890 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 2057).
61. I.R.C. § 2057(a)(1)-(2).
62. See text accompanying notes 51-54 supra.
63. I.R.C. § 2057(b).
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II. ELECTION AGAINST A WILL AND THE REJECTION
OF EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
The problem of allocating federal estate taxes is also signifi-
cant in those instances in which a surviving spouse chooses to elect
against the will. When a testator bequeaths less to his spouse than
that which is granted under the election statute, the spouse may elect
to take the statutory share in lieu of such provision. Whether the
electing spouse will bear any of the estate tax liability depends on
whether the elective share is computed before or after the deduction
of federal estate taxes. Since the elective share is based on the net
estate, which is determined after the payment of estate taxes, an un-
necessary complication exists because the marital deduction can not be
computed until the net amount to be received by the surviving spouse
is known.
The Ohio Supreme Court first considered the question of the
federal estate tax burden relative to a surviving spouse's elective share
in Miller v. Hammond.65  Based on the statutory grant of equity power
to the probate court and the failure to find statutory authority to
require the surviving spouse to contribute to the payment of federal
taxes, the court applied the equitable theory of proration and held
that the elective share was free of the burden of federal estate taxes
up to the full allowable marital deduction. Two years later the Ohio
Supreme Court reconsidered the question in Campbell v. Lloyd66 and
overruled Miller.
The surviving spouse in Campbell elected to take against the will
and the personal representative sought to determine whether federal
estate taxes should be deducted before computing the elective share.
Directions were not included in the decedent's will for the payment of
estate taxes. Deducting federal estate taxes before computing the
share results in charging the elective share with taxes since the size
of the share is less than it would be otherwise. The fact that the elec-
tive share qualified for the marital deduction and did not generate
estate tax liability was not thought to be controlling by the court. It
reasoned that since the surviving spouse is not entitled to receive the
distribution of the elective share until after the payment of debts,
64. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page 1976) provides in part:
After the probate of a will and the filing of the inventory, appraisement. and a
schedule of debts where ordered, the probate court shall issue a citation to the surviing
spouse, if any be living at the time of the issuance of the citation, to elect whether to
take under the will or under. section 2105.06 of the Revised Code. If the spouse elects
to take under section 2105.06 of the Revised Code, the spouse shall take not to exceed
one-half of the net estate unless two or more of the decedent's children or their lineal
descendants survive, in which case the spouse shall take not to exceed one-third of the
net estate.
65- 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E.2d 9 (1952).
66. 162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 911.
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including federal estate taxes, the election statute itself gave a share
based on a diminished amount. Thus, the share that the electing
spouse is entitled to can be computed only after the deduction of
federal estate taxes.67
The court refused to follow the concept of equitable apportion-
ment articulated in Miller and McDougall, reasoning that the elec-
tion statute is inconsistent with its application. The election statute
is framed in terms of the "net estate,, 68 and the concept of the net
estate includes only that which remains of the probate estate after the
payment of all debts and charges, including federal estate taxes.69
The effect of the decision was to reduce the electing spouse's share by
the federal estate tax even though the distributable assets received de-
creased the federal tax burden due to the applicable marital deduction.
Campbell did not decide the question whether a testamentary
provision directing payment of estate taxes out of a portion of the
estate bequeathed to someone other than the electing spouse requires
a different view. This question was, however, resolved some years later
in Weeks v. Vandeveer.70 The tax clause in the testator's will directed
the executor to pay all estate and inheritance taxes out of that portion
of the estate remaining after his wife received her share, whether his
property passed under the will or not. The surviving spouse elected
against the will, but also claimed the beneficial effect of the tax clause? 1
In rejecting the spouse's claim, the court reasoned that the statute
limiting the spouse's claim to a fraction of the net estate was control-
ling, and under Campbell the net estate was the portion of the probate
estate remaining after the satisfaction of the obligations against the
estate, including the federal estate tax. The court was of the opinion
that the testator's intent on the matter was irrelevant since the election
statute was designed to provide a uniform method of computing a
statutory share:
However, it is not difficult to envision a particular tax clause in a different
will detrimentally affecting the widow's intestate share by saddling it
with some or all of the burden of those taxes. Certainly the General
Assembly of Ohio intended to provide a uniform rule for computing the
statutory share of a surviving spouse who chooses (or is forced) to accept
an intestate share. The better rule is to place all who elect to take
against the will on equal footing under the statutes. Thus, the presence
or absence of a tax provision in the will of a testator cannot be per-
67. Id. at 208, 122 N.E.2d at 698.
68. OHio Rav. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page 1976).
69. 162 Ohio St. at 208, 122 N.E.2d at 698.
70. 13 Ohio St.2d 15, 233 N.E.2d 502 (1968); accord, Estate of Ptkngas, 52 T.C. 99 (1969).
71. 13 Ohio St. at 21, 233 N.E.2d at 506.
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mitted to alter the statutory share of a surviving spouse electing to take
against the wilL
7 2
Under Ohio law, therefore, the provisions of the will on the
allocation of estate taxes are immaterial in determining the rights of a
spouse electing against the will. The presence of a tax clause exoner-
ating the surviving spouse does not alter the statutory share of the
electing spouse. If the will directs that the surviving spouse's share
is to pass free of federal estate taxes, such a tax clause in the will has
no effect on the elective share and federal estate taxes are deducted
in computing it.
Underlying the Weeks interpretation of the election statute are
two fundamental premises: first, an election is a total rejection of the
will and not just of the dispositive share provided the electing spouse;
and second, the election statute specifies that the elective share is to
be computed as a fractional portion of the net estate. As a result,
the electing spouse under current law cannot claim the benefit of a tax
clause that would otherwise be beneficial to the electing spouse.
A rejection of the dispositive provision by election should not be
taken simultaneously as a rejection of an administrative provision.
Distinguishing the rejection of the dispositive provision from the
administrative provision embodied in the tax clause can be justified
since the distinction permits furtherance of the decedent's wishes
concerning the allocation of the tax burden. A tax clause is included
in a will as a tax-saving device, and by including the clause the
testator makes clear his intention to keep estate taxes as low as pos-
sible. The election should not be allowed to disrupt the testamentary
plan any more than is absolutely necessary. Disruption is less when
the administrative provision on the allocation of the tax burden is
carried forward.
As Weeks indicates, the elective share is computed as a frac-
tional portion of the net estate. A number of arguments support
legislative action to change the statute so that that elective share is
exonerated from contribution to estate tax liability. The most com-
pelling argument supporting this proposition arises from considera-
tion of the marital deduction and its relation to overall estate taxes.
The result of the Campbell decision and Ohio's continued adherence
to the policy of computing the elective share after the satisfaction of
estate taxes is striking in terms of its impact on total estate taxes.
Under Ohio law the size of the elective share is affected by the amount
of the tax due. Since the marital deduction is not as large as it
would be if the elective share were not charged with estate taxes, the
72. Id. at 20-21, 233 N.E.2d at 506 (emphasis in original).
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estate tax liability is correspondingly greater. This problem is further
aggravated by the Tax Reform Act of 1976." When property passing
to the electing spouse qualifies for the marital deduction the estate
taxes will be less if estate taxes are disregarded in computing the
elective share. To the extent that any portion of the elective share
does not qualify for the marital deduction, that portion should con-
tribute to meeting the tax burden.
The question whether the elective share is to be computed before
or after deducting estate taxes is answered by a basic policy determina-
tion of the legislature. The proposition that an election is a rejection
of the will should not be viewed as a serious obstacle to legislative
action. The federal estate tax law provides for the full allowance of
the marital deduction and the Ohio legislature should take action to
insure that this deduction is obtained in full for its citizens. Absent a
judicial overruling of Campbell, a change of this magnitude can be
accomplished only by legislative action. 4
The final arguments for not charging the elective share should
be considered. The legislative policy underlying the philosophy
of the election statute would be furthered by insulating the electing
spouse from contribution to the extent the share qualifies for the mari-
tal deduction. The philosophy of the election statute is protection
of the surviving spouse from disinheritance or inadequate testamen-
tary provision.7" In many instances, however, the elective share pro-
vides ineffective protection for a spouse, since the elective share is a
function of the net probate estate. 76  A spouse may be effectively de-
prived of the statutory share by inter vivos transfers which ultimate-
ly reduce the size of the net probate estate." Furthermore, the 1976
Ohio Probate Reform Act decreased the protection afforded the elect-
ing spouse relative to the protection given a spouse of a decedent dying
intestate. Among other changes, the Probate Reform Act provided
that a surviving spouse of an intestate decedent was entitled to a
greater share of the decedent's estate than under former law. 78 The
election statute allows the electing spouse to take under the statute
of descent and distribution, but the election statute also imposes a
maximum limit on the amount that can be taken. Since the maxi-
mum limit under the election statute was not changed by the Probate
73. See note 51 supra.
74. A statutory provision to the effect that the elective share "shall be estimated and
determined before any federal estate tax is deducted or paid and shall be free and clear of such
tax" is a possible approach. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(a) (1976).
75. See T. ATxINSON, LAW OF WILLS § 33 (2d ed. 1953).
76. Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961). See also
Purcell v. Cleveland Trust Co., 6 Ohio App.2d 235, 217 N.E.2d 876 (1965).
77. Curry, Intestate Succession and Wills: A Comparative Analysis of Article II of the Uni-
form Probate Code and the Law of Ohio, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 114, 134 (1973),
78. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (Page 1976).
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Reform Act the increased protection under the statute of descent and
distribution did not inure to the benefit of the electing spouse.
The additional benefit of simplicity in determining the estate's
tax obligation would be obtained if the elective share of the surviving
spouse were not charged. Charging such share with estate tax results
in an interrelated tax computation that can be solved only by using
an algebraic formula or by a tedious trial and error method. Inter-
related tax computations can be avoided by adopting the policy of
not charging the elective spouse with a portion of the estate tax lia-
bility to the extent it qualifies for the marital deduction. In an era
of increasing tax complexity, simplicity is a virtue not to be ignored.
III. POLICIES TO BE REFLECTED IN THE STATUTORY
METHOD OF ALLOCATION
The need for legislative action to replace the burden on the res-
idue rule with a statutory method of apportionment has been estab-
lished in the preceding parts of this article. But before the legisla-
ture adopts either partial apportionment or full apportionment it
should identify the policies sought to be furthered and resolve any
conflict between competing policies. This part of the article will
identify the major policies that should be reflected in the statutory
method of allocation and propose the adoption of the full apportion-
ment approach contained within the Uniform Probate Code."
The fundamental point of disagreement between the proponents
79. Pertinent portions of § 3-916 of the Uniform Probate Code are as follow.
(b) Unless the will otherwise provides, the tax shall be apportioned among all
persons interested in the estate. The apportionment is to be made in the proportion
that the value of the interest of each person interested in the estate bears to the total
value of the interests of all persons interested in the estate. The values used in deter-
mining the tax are to be used for that purpose. If the decedent's will directs a method
of apportionment of tax different from the method described in this Code, the method
described in the will controls.
(c)(2) If the Court finds that it is inequitable to apportion interest and penalties in
the manner provided in subsection (b), because of special circumstances, it may direct
apportionment thereof in the manner it finds equitable.
(d)(1) The personal representative or other person in possession of the property of
the decedent required to pay the tax may withhold from any property distributable to any
person interested in the estate, upon its distribution to him, the amount of tax attribut-
able to his interest. If the property in possession of the personal representative or
other person required to pay the tax and distributable to any person interested in the
estate is insufficient to satisfy the proportionate amount of the tax determined to be due
from the person, the personal representative or other person required to pay the tax
may recover the deficiency from the person interested in the estate. If the property
is not in the possession of the personal representative or the other person required to
pay the tax, the personal representative or the other person required to pay the tax
may recover from any person interested in the estate the amount of the tax appor-
tioned to the person in accordance with this Act.
(2) If property held by the personal representative is distributed prior to final ap-
portionment of the tax, the distributee shall provide a bond or other security for the
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of partial"0 and full apportionment is whether the concept of appor-
tionment should be applied to both nonprobate and probate assets.
apportionment liability in the form and amount prescribed by tl'e personal representa-
tive.
(e)(1) In making an apportionment, allowances shall be made for any exemptions
granted, any classification made of persons interested in the esta.e and for any deduc-
tions and credits allowed by the law imposing the tax.
(2) Any exemption or deduction allowed by reason of the relationship of any
person to the decedent or by reason of the purposes of the gift inures to the benefit
of the person bearing such relationship or receiving the gift; but if an interest is sub-
ject to a prior present interest which is not allowable as a deduction, the tax appor-
tionable against the present interest shall be paid from principal.
(3) Any deduction for property previously taxed and any credit for gift taxes or
death taxes of a foreign country paid by the decedent or his estate inures to the pro-
portionate benefit of all persons liable to apportionment.
(4) Any credit for inheritance, succession or estate taxes c r taxes in the nature
thereof applicable to property or interests includable in the estate, inures to the bene-
fit of the persons or interests chargeable with the payment thereof to the extent pro-
portionately that the credit reduces the tax.
(5) To the extent that property passing to or in trust for a surviving spouse or
any charitable, public or similar purpose is not an allowable deduction for purposes of
the tax solely by reason of an inheritance tax or other death tax imposed upon and
deductible from the property, the property is not included in the computation provided
for in subsection (b) hereof, and to that extent no apportionment is made against the
property. The sentence immediately preceding does not apply to any case if the result
would be to deprive the estate of a deduction otherwise allowable under Section 2053(d)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, of the United States, relating to
deduction for state death taxes on transfers for public, charitable, or religious uses,
(f) No interest in income and no estate for years or for life or other temporary
interest in any property or fund is subject to apportionment as between the temporary
interest and the remainder. The tax on the temporary interest and the tax, if any, on
the remainder is chargeable against the corpus of the property or funds subject to the
temporary interest and remainder.
The following outlines the method of computing estate taxes und-r the Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 90-455, 90 Stat. 1890, [hereinafter TRA]:
Computation of Tentative Tax Base:
Taxable Estate
Add: Adjusted Taxable Gifts
Equals: Tentative Tax Base
Computation of Estate Tax:
Tentative Tax (based on tentative tax basis)
Less: Gift Taxes on all post-1976 gifts
Equals: Tentative Estate Tax before Credits
Less: Unified Credit
Equals: Gross Estate Tax
Less: Credit for State Death Taxes
Equals: Estate Tax Before Other Credits
Less: Other Credits
Equals: Net Estate Tax
The TRA requires a tentative tax base to be ascertained by combining the amount of the taxable
estate with the total amount of taxable gifts made by the decedent after 1976, other than
gifts includible in the decedent's gross estate-such as gifts made within three years of the
decedents' death. I.R.C. § 2035, as amended by TRA § 2001(a)(5). Adjusted taxable gifts are
included in the estate tax computation under the TRA but are not definitionally included in the
Uniform Probate Code's definition of "estate." The Uniform Probate Code defines estate as
"the gross estate of a decedent as determined for the purpose of federal estate tax and the
estate tax payable to this state." UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-916(a)(1). This definition
does not take into account the TRA's inclusion of adjusted taxable gifts. Although the de-
tailed examination of this question is beyond the scope of this article, the question for the
legislature can be identified as being whether the inclusion of adjusted taxable gifts in the
computation of the net estate tax requires a redefinition of the term "estate" as used in the
UPC. The essence of the policy question is whether the principle of equitable apportionment,
which is the underlying philosophy of the UPC, should be applied to the recipients of inter
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Some time ago Professor Powell, a proponent of partial apportion-
ment, argued that disposers of property, who are well advised, infre-
quently desire apportionment of federal estate taxes as to the assets
passing under their wills but rather commonly desire such apportion-
ment as to assets passing outside their wills. 81 This argument relates
to the essence of the policy to be reflected in the legislative action.
The most compelling policy which should be achieved by the method
of allocation is the implementation of a system that most clearly
coincides with the probable intentions of the majority of testators.
Notwithstanding Professor Powelrs argument, however, a majority of
states that have adopted statutory solutions to the method of appor-
tionment have selected full apportionment.82
A number of related policy considerations support the adoption
of the full apportionment method of allocating estate taxes. Although
the Internal Revenue Code is mostly silent on estate tax allocation,
the full apportionment method is consistent with provisions of the fed-
eral estate tax that consider the problem. 3
A decedent who dies intestate leaves no expression of intent
with regard to the allocation of death taxes. Under these circum-
stances the impact is distributed equally since there is no justification
for placing a greater burden on one part of the taxable estate than
another.8 4  Likewise, the Internal Revenue Code provides that the
beneficiaries of the decedent's life insurance, and persons receiving
property over which the decedent had a taxable power of appoint-
ment, are required to contribute proportionately to the payment of the
federal estate tax, unless the testator has directed otherwise.8 5 As
previously discussed, 86 nonprobate assets generating estate tax liability
are also required to contribute proportionately to the payment of fed-
eral estate taxes. Full apportionment is consistent in approach with
the way in which these other questions of allocation are handled.
Thus, it would not only promote uniformity, but would be consistent
vivos gifts as a result of the inclusion of adjusted taxable gifts in the computation of the net
estate tax.
80. Recently, a proposed statute patterned after the Massachusetts and Florida approach
to apportionment was proposed for adoption in Ohio. The basic substantive impact of the
adoption of the proposal would be 1) to codify the McDougall and Penney cases and 2) adopt
the burden on the residue principle with the important modification that residuary assets not
generating estate tax liability would not bear any tax liability. See Note. The Apportionment
Doctrine-A Proposed Ohio Estate Tax Apportionment Statute, 41 U. Cas. L. REV. 897. 919-25
(1972).
81. Powell, Ultimate Liability for Federal Estate Taxes, [1958] WASh. U.L.Q. 327 338
(1958).
82. Twenty-eight states have enacted full apportionment statutes. See note 7 supra.
83. See I.R.C. §§ 2206, 2207.
84. McDougall v. Central Bank, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952).
85. I.R.C. § 2042(b).
86. See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
19771
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
with the concept of a single taxable estate and the essence of an
estate tax lien.87
The policy of uniformity would also be advanced from a conflict
of laws perspective by the adoption of the full apportionment meth-
od.88 As long as state methods of allocating estate taxes differ, dif-
ficulties will exist when ancillary administration is required. When
assets are left in a nondomiciliary jurisdiction, the personal repre-
sentative may have to sue in a foreign forum to collect for contribu-
tion and a conflict of laws problem may result. Since a majority
of jurisdictions have adopted full apportionment, the quest for general
uniformity of result would be furthered by the adoption of full ap-
portionment in Ohio.
To the fullest extent possible, the method of allocation adopted
by the legislature should be aimed at avoiding unexpected results in
the distribution of the decendent's estate. The justification for re-
quiring nonprobate assets that generate estate tax liability to con-
tribute to the payment of the tax is founded on the furtherance of this
policy, being based on the assumption that the testator may not real-
ize that nonprobate assets will be included in his estate for tax pur-
poses.8 9 Conversely, the basis for requiring the residue to bear the
estate tax burden is predicated on the assumption that the testator is
aware of the tax effects of his distribution scheme. Unless the prem-
ise is accepted that the testator is knowledgeably aware of the tax
impact on the probate estate, partial apportionment may subject the
estate to unexpected tax results and directly affect the amount avail-
able for distribution to the residuary beneficiaries. The seriousness
of this ramification is increased since experience has demonstrated
that in most estates the residuary legatees are the surviving spouse,
children, or other dependents. 90 The assumption of knowledgeable
awareness may have an adverse impact not only on those who are
nearest to the decedent but who are also most likely to be the para-
mount objects of the testator's bounty. In contrast full apportionment
avoids the apparent inconsistency of making the degree of knowledge-
able awareness dependent on whether probate or nonprobate assets
are involved by distributing the burden uniformly between those per-
sons interested in the taxable estate.
The proponents of partial apportionment argue that charging the
residue with estate taxes generated by the probate estate is consistent
with the treatment of debts and other costs of administration. The
substantial appeal of this argument centers on the similarity of estate
87. See I.R.C. § 6324(a)(2) and Treas. Reg. § 301.6324-1 (1972).
88. Scoles, Estate Tax Apportionment and Conflicts, 55 COLUMI. L. REv. 261. 266 (1955),
89. Comment, Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax-Should North Carolina Adopt
an Apportionment Statute?, 52 N.C.L. REv. 737, 748 (1974).
90. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
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taxes to these other costs. Estate taxes are dissimilar, however, in cer-
tain important respects from these other charges traditionally paid
from the residue, and these dissimilarities further the argument in
favor of full apportionment. In addition to the obvious difference
in the nature of an estate tax-public levy on the right to transfer prop-
erty on death governed by a complex array of statutory provisions-
estate taxes are distinguishable from debts and costs of administration
in another fundamental respect. At the time a will is executed a
testator is arguably more likely to appreciate the significance and im-
pact of debts and costs of administration than estate taxes since the
testator retains a greater degree of control over them. The govern-
ment regulates the imposition of estate taxes, whereas the individual
more effectively controls the other charges. As the passage of time
between the execution of the will and the death of the testator be-
comes greater, the testator is more likely to have a continuing ap-
preciation of the effect of other charges on the distributive scheme
than estate taxes. Failure to recognize this can conflict with the
policy of avoiding unexpected results.
Once the legislature decides that apportionment is desirable as
a matter of policy, consideration should be given to the scope of its
operation. The impact the apportionment statute will have on the
elective share is one important consideration. The legislature must
decide whether the apportionment statute will apply so as to exone-
rate the elective share from the payment of taxes when a surviving
spouse elects to take against the will. Since the election statute
specifically provides that the share is computed on the basis of the
net estate and the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the share is to
be charged with taxes,91 enactment of an apportionment statute will
result in a conflict with the election statute.
As previously discussed,92 a number of policy arguments can be
advanced in support of exonerating the elective share from estate
taxes. In addition to providing the estate with the opportunity to
obtain the maximum marital deduction, exoneration is consistent with
the protective policy underlying the objective of the statute. Once
the position that the elective share should be computed without
charging it with estate taxes is accepted as being desirable, the leg-
islature must decide whether this result will be achieved by applying
the apportionment statute in election cases or by an independent
amendment to the election statute.
Under the proposed apportionment statute, contained in the Uni-
form Probate Code, the testator can set up his own scheme of tax
allocation by an express provision in his will. This statutory allow-
91. Campbell v. Lloyd, 162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695 (1954).
92. See text accompanying notes 73-78 supra.
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ance that preserves the testator's right to reject apportionment is in
conflict with the policy of establishing a uniform rule for computing
elective shares. The conflict exists since a decedent may direct that
the surviving spouse is to be responsible for some or all of the death
tax liability. Allowing the testator to preempt the apportionment
statute, which if applicable would exonerate the elective share, would
result in charging the statutory share with taxes. This result rtiay be
defended as being desirable on the basis that it furthers the expressed
intention of the testator. On the other hand, allowing a particular
tax clause to detrimentally affect the statutory share results in a dif-
ferent share for electing spouses of identical estates depending on
whether or not there is an adverse tax clause in the will.
The election statute reflects the policy that in certain instances
the testator's expressed testamentary provision, at the surviving
spouse's option, can be rejected. The essence of election is the sur-
viving spouse's right to take against the decedent's will. Allowing the
testator to impose the death tax burden on the spouse conflicts with
the concept that the testator lacks the power to affect the elective
share and with the policy of placing all who elect on an equal basis
under the election statute. Since the right to preempt is an essential
principle underlying the apportionment statute, it is more desirable
to exempt the elective share independently of the apportionment
statute. Exoneration of the elective share could be accomplished by
amending the election statute to provide 1) that the elective share
is to be computed before any estate tax is deducted or paid and is
to be free and clear of such tax, and 2) that the election shall not
be governed by the apportionment statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under Ohio law the method of allocating the estate tax burden
when a testator fails to fix the burden is primarily dependent on the
elements of the taxable estate. When the taxable estate consists ex-
clusively of probate assets the burden on the residue rule is followed.
The nature of a residuary disposition is conclusively presumed to dic-
tate charging the residuary with the estate tax liability. In three
instances this conclusive presumption frustrates rather than furthers
the actual intention of the testator. The first instance is when the
surviving spouse is a residuary beneficiary and the spouse's share of
the residuary qualifies for the marital deduction. Second, a conclu-
sive presumption may frustiate the testator's actual intent in certain
instances when a charity is a residuary beneficiary and the charity's
share of the residuary qualifies for a charitable deduction. In those
instances when the charity's share of the residue is either substantially
depreciated or completely destroyed by charging it with estate taxes,
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the burden on the residue rule produces results that are predict-
ably inconsistent with the testator's expectations. Finally, under the
new orphan's deduction when the child's share is part of the residuary
it too may be depleted by estate taxes. The deduction will be lost
along with the bequest to the child. In applying the burden on the
residue rule the impact of estate taxes should be examined to deter-
mine whether the testator had an intent with respect to fixing the
estate tax burden. If the results suggest that the testator did not have
intent with respect to estate taxes, courts should not view themselves
as being prevented from equitably apportioning the estate tax liability.
Under Ohio law when a surviving spouse elects to take against
the will the spouse's share is charged with a pro rata share of estate
taxes. This result comports with the language of the election statute,
which requires the computation to be made on the basis of the net
estate. This result, however, is objectionable, as a matter of policy,
for a variety of reasons: 1) the approach fails to distinguish rejection
of a distributive provision from an administrative provision; 2) charg-
ing the elective share results in greater estate taxes through inter-
related compounding, 3) the legislative policy underlying the statutory
right of election is partially frustrated; and, 4) the computation of the
marital deduction is needlessly complex.
A reformulation of Ohio's approach to allocating estate taxes
when a testator fails to fix the burden and when a surviving spouse
elects against the will can most effectively be accomplished by legis-
lative action. Failure by the legislature to take corrective action to
insure that its citizens obtain the full marital deduction will result
in the continued penalizing of its citizenry. The financial disadvantage
will be exacerbated since Ohio's policy on estate tax allocation does
not take into account the liberalized provisions of the marital deduc-
tion contained in the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Inaction will also
continue the undesirable situation whereby the conclusive presump-
tion underlying the judicial establishment of the burden on the residue
rule is in potential conflict with a testator's actual intent with regard
to the allocation of the estate tax burden.
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